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THE LAW-MAKING POWER,
The law-making powerof the state istbe governing power of the
,state. Jt is the power to make laws, and to alter ,andrepeal them.
It is -the power, to regulate civil cond-nct; .tQromote by-good laws
the welfare of the subject, or byfbad, laws to; provoke qalamity and
r~uin., 
.
* When the American people came to establish goyernments,,they
acted o'i the principle that the law-making, power should be kept;
,distinct from the. law-executing,and the ,aTinterpreting. powers.
They understood perfectly. well tbhatany government, Mst of neces-
isity be an -arbitrary goyerument-where, such a Aepayation, of othe
powers is not established., They consequently in the:Onstitptions
of the several States, and. in, that of the, Feder al Government,
lodged the legislative power in one body, the executive po~yer in
..another.body,,and the, judicial- power instil another. .,
While the legislative, executive and judicial ,epartmenRt§ of gov-
ernmen are co6rdinate in -theory, yet in-reality, circumstances
conspire to ,,giye to, the.legislative, department a super.iority over
the othertwo.. Its,constitutional powers are conceded to be more
extensive, and, as) Madison declared,, less susceptible : of precise
limits. More frequently than the other, twoit.usurps,,powers 'that
-do not pertain to, it. ,The tendencyvfom the beginning U f our
history hag been toward an- aggrandizement of the legislative Dower
at the expense of theother departments ofthe goyernment. ,"In
republican governments," says Tlamiltop,- the legislativeauthority
necessarily predominates.", ,
The judicial branch of the governmien.tis regar~ed as the weakest
of the three--great departments.- Montesquieu asserts,that the
judiciary is, as compared with the other departments, " next to
nothing." And Hamilton, in the Federqlist, speaks as follows
of it:
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"Whoever attentively considers the different departments of
power must perceive that in a government in which they are sepa-
rated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its func-
tions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
the constitution, because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or
injure them." (Federalist, p. 575.)
The executive holds the sword, the legislature the power.
In law-making the chief power rests with those who have the
right of initiating legislation. In earlier times the right of initia-
tive was with the king, and the assembly assented or withheld its
assent in respect to matters which heyroposed. In the law-making
bodies of our own country the method of making laws is exactly
the reverse. The legislature initiates, and the executive approves
or vetoes the laws proposed to him.
Legislatures, as law-making bodies, are comparatively of very
recent appearance. The earliest attempt to distinguish between
legislative and executive power is attributed to an Italian writer
of the fourteenth century. The assemblies from which many of
the legislative bodies have been derived were assemblies of the
great men of the state, whose office it was simply to advise and
control the king. They did not originate, or make laws in the
manner in which that power is now exercised by the law-making
bodies.
The American people in framing the several State constitutions
did not exhibit any special distrust of the legislative department.
In the first State constitutions the law-making power was conferred
in very general teritis, and such restraints as were imposed resulted
rather as a consequence of a written instrument and of a division
of power than as a principle, had in mind in creating the govern-
ment. The people distrusted both the executive and the judicial
departments more than they did the legislative department. In
nine of thirteen of the States the constitutions provided that the
Governor should be elected by the legislative department, and in
eleven States he was given no veto on the action of the legislative
body. In five of the States the legislature had the power to review
the action of the judiciary, being authorized to sit as a court of
last resort. It was not long however before experience demon-
strated that it was the legislative power after all which was dan-
gerous and upon which it was desirable to impose additional restric-
tions.
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If we examine the systems otgovernment which ecist in Europe
and contrast their legislative departments with those we have
established, we shall find marked differences distinguishing them.
Sir Edward Coke said of the power and jurisdiction of Parliament
that "it is so transcendent and absolute that it cannotbe confiied,
either for persons or causes, within any bounds. * * * It hath.
sovereign and uncontrolled authority in the making, confirming,.
enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expound-
ing of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations,
ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime or criminal; this
being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in
all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution
of these kingdoms."
In France, too, the legislative department is supreme.. The
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate seem to be invested with
sovereign power, and can alter at their will the constitution itself:
The American people, it is unnecessary to say, have never con-
ferred on the legislative department in any State, or in the Nation,
any such unlimited power as is possessed by the law-making power.
in the countries I have named. On the other hand, the people in
this country have conferred on the legislative department in each
State, as well as in the Nation, a more absolute power than is con-
ferred upon the same department in the Swiss Confederatioh.
It is a settled maxim of constitutional law in the United States,
that the law-making power conferred upon the legislative depart-
ment cannot be delegated to any other body or authority. "The
prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to be, that except in
those cases where by the constitution the people have expressly
reserved to themselves a power of decision, the function of legisla-
tion cannot be exercised by them, even to the extent of accepting
or rejecting a law which has been framed for their consideration." *
But in Switzerland the legislative department of the government
is obliged to submit the laws which it passes to a vote of the people,
provided a sufficient number of citizens petition that they be sub-
mitted to that ordeal. In some'of the States of Switzerland, no
law which has passed the legislature can go into operation until it
has been submitted to the people and approved by ihem.
The history of the English Parliament shows that the functions
which it performs at the present time are very different from those
• Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.
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which it discharged in former times. The idea which we now
have of it is that it is a law-making, a law-creating body. But
this was not its function in the earlier ages. It was designed to be
not so much a law-creating as a law-preserving body. The exist-
ing laws and customs of the people were not to be changed by the
king unless the parliament consented thereto. The principal con-
cern of the people was to preserve their old laws and customs, not
to enact new ones, or alter the old ones. The Great Charter of
King John claimed to be a transcript of ancient laws, and not a
creation of new rights and privileges. Its language was:
"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized, or out-
lawed, or banished, or in any wise destroyed, nor will we pass upon
him or commit him to prison unless by the legal judgment of his.
peers or by the law of the land."
But it is noticeable that this document, so often referred to as
the foundation of constitutional government in England, and as
the basis of our liberties, contains no reference to the previous
existence of any legislative assembly, and makes no provision for
creating any such assembly in the future, although it provides for
an election in each county of twelve knights whose duty it shall be
to inquire Qf bad customs to be abolished in the manner specified
in the Charter. Beyond providing an assembly for this repeal of
bad customs, and for the imposition of taxes or aids, as well'as for
the conversion of military service due by tenure into the payment
of a money rent, the people of that time do not appear to have
been concerned about the subject of legislation.*
In Great Britain, we are told by a writer on the English Consti-
tution, that the legislature chosen, in name, to make laws, "in fact
finds its principal business in making and in keeping an execu-
tive "- meaning thereby the prime minister. t The cabinet system
prevailing in that country clearly weakens the legislative power.
A cabinet often compels legislation by a threat of dissolution, or
by a threat of resignation. The fear that if one votes against the
ministry one may soon not have a vote at all, is a potential factor
in securing the passage of imeasures which the ministry desire.
The writer last referred to expresses the opinion that in England a
strong cabinet can obtain the concurrence of the legislatuxe in all
acts which facilitate its administration,I and he declares that.
* See Smith's History of the English Parliament, vol. 1, p. 100.
t Bagehot on the English Constitution, 3d ed. p. 12.
t Ibid. p. 23.
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members of, the House of Commons are mostly, perhaps, elected
because they will vote for a particular ministry, rather than for
purely legislative reasons,* the'House of Commons being mainly
and above all things an elective 'assembly. The election, he says,
is now the most important function of the House of Commons. It
does not rule- it only elects the rulers. t : - .......
The law-making power does not reside 'exclusively in the legis-
lative deartment of government. It is found to exist in the ju-
dicial department, which creates law as well' as' interprets it. In
theory the legislative and judicial departments of the government
are separate and distinct. ' The function of the legislative depart-
ment is to enact the law, while that of the judicial, department is
simply to interpret it. But while this separation may be theoreti-
cally complete, it is found not so in actual practice. "You do not
need to be reminded that the judges in our courts of last resort
are obliged to legislate in cases which are new in principle, and in
respect'to which the' legislative will is un (pressed. In su'chcases
the courts make new rules, and in doing so exercise the legislative
function. ''And this power the courts 'possess even under constitu-
tions the most explicit in forbidding either of the three depart-
ments of government exercising the powers Of the other two. The
Massachusetts constitution 'of'1780, for instance,' delared that 'the
legislative departiment-..
"Shall never exercise the 'executive and judioial powers, or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them, the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to
the end it may 'be a government of laws, and not of men."
But such a provision as this did not prevent, and, was ndt in-
tended to prevent, the judges, in 'deciding cases, from etablishing
new principles where the statutory law was inapplicable and no
precedent could be found which governed the questions in dispute.
'The courts exercise the law-making power not alone in cases
where the legishtive will-is unexpressed. They exercise it- as well
in cases where it is expressed, When they are called on'to interpret
" Ibid, pp. 2., 142.
f Ibid, pp. 132, 140. "A good horse likes to feel the rider's bit; and a
great 'eliberative assembly likes to feel that it is under worthy guidance.
A minister who succumbs to the House-who ostentatiously seeks its
pleasure-who does not try to regulate it- who will not boldly point out
plain errors to it, seldom thrives."
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the meaning of the statute in which the legislative will is supposed
to be embodied. To quote the words of an English bishop, spoken
almost two hundred years ago, and quoted several times of late:
"Whoever bath an absolute authority to interpret any written
or spoken laws, it is e' who is truly the law-giver, to all1 intents
and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."
Before him., and three hundred years ago, Montaigne had
written:
"I am not much pleased with his opinion, who thought by the
multitude of laws to curb the authority of judges. * * *
He was not aware that there is as much liberty and stretch in the
interpretation of laws as in their fashion; * * * human wit
does not find the field less spacious wherein to controvert the sense
of another than to deliver his own."*
Not only is it true that the courts make law, but they make
more law than do the legislative bodies. Lord Mansfield is quoted
as saying to a friend that in his judicial work he created more law
than both houses of parliament.
The law of bailments resulted from an exercise of the law-mak-
ing power of the judiciary in the great case of Coggs v. Bernard,
when Lord Holt introduced the whole civil law relating to that
subject into the common law of England. This branch of the law
was not planted on its Roman foundation by any action of parlia-
ment, but is pure and simple judge-made law. The law of insur-
ance was practically created by Lord -Mansfield. He it likewise
was who established our system of maritime law, ingtafting into
the common law principles never enacted by the legislative depart-
ment. He built up the commercial law of England, adopting
from the law of the continent such principles as commended them-
selves to his judgment as most just and useful. So in the exercise
of the law-making power of the judiciary. Lord -Nottingham and
Lord Ilardwick reduced the principles of equity into a scientific
system. The most useful and important principles of the law
of contracts arc not to be found in the statutes enacted by parlia-
ment. but were incorporated into the common law by judges who
borrowed them from the civil law.
As between the legislature and the judiciary , the former is the
superior law-making power of the state, as it has the authority to
declare that the law as promulgated by the latter power shall not be
* Montaignes Works. p. 519.
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law thereafter. And the tendency of our times has been for this
superior law-making power to narrow materially the domain
within which this inferior power can legislate. It is evident that
every time a legislature regulates by statute a subject which before
was governed by the common law, it limits pro tanto the legisla-
tive power of the judiciary. For while a rule rests on unwritten
law, the courts may modify or change it by a re-examination or re-
interpretation of the previously decided cases; but they loose that
right the moment the legislature passes a statute declaring a writ-
ten rule. Then the power of the courts is confined simply to an
interpretation of the language which the legislature has employed.
To the extent that the law is codified, to that extent the judiciary
is limited in its legislative powers. Codification means a transfer
from the judiciary to the legislature of the development of the law,
and an elimination, in very large degree, of the judiciary as a law-
making power. When codification is accomplished, judicial legis-
lation ceases except to the extent that it becomes necessary to con-
strue the written language.
The law-making power of the courts is often attacked on the
ground that it is "undemocratic," and that it is contrary to the
genius of our American States that legislation should emanate from
any but the people's representatives, and be other than an expies-
sion of the popular will. That the legislature of the States should
seek to place limitations on the law-making power of the judiciary
is in accord with the democratic idea. In the history of the exer-
cise of the law-making power in the United States we might nat-
urally expect to find the legislatures narrowing the bonds of judi-
cial legislation in obedience to the imperious demand of the people
that they should be permitted to formulate the laws-through their
representatives chosen for the purpose. But as a matter of fact,
thus far in our history the demand that the courts should be de-
prived of their law-making power has been made almost exclusively
by the members of our own profession, the people as such appar-
ently taking little interest in the matter. It-is also probably true
that the profession, as a whole, has until lately been opposed to the
change. In this country the movement in favor of a codification
.of the law began in the State of New York, with the adoption of
its code of 1848. It was received in its own State with a tide of
professional derision. We are told that in 1850, at a banquet of
the New York City Bar, one of its most distinguished members
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proposed as a toast, "Jack Cade and Jack Code!"-and that the
toast was drunk with much eclat. And Mr. David Dudley Field
himself declared, speaking a year or so ago in. relation, to the cod-
ification of the law in New York, that "nothing of, this would
have come about if the ]awyer's of New York as a body had had
their way."*
The appointment of the commission in NewYork with instruc-
tions to reduce into a systematic, and written, code somuch of the
law of the State as they might deemw practicable and expedient
was due to action taken by the Constitutional Convention of. 1846;
and it is fair to say that the resolution authorizing the appoint-
ment of the commission was not introduced by, a lawyer, but by. a
merchant from the city of New, York, Mr. Campbell P.,White.
The agitation in favor of the movement originated as early as 186,
with a small coterie of lawyers, and the discussion was mainly con-
fined to members of the profession. The fact that the resolution
was formally moved by a layman, of course affords no proof even
that it was drawn by a layman, and certainly, does not establish
the fact that the people as such were deeply interested in the
matter.
The law-making power of the legislative department of govern-
ment generally operates prospectively, while that of the judiciary
operates retrospectively. Retrospective legislation proceeding from
the legislative department is so objectionable in principle that the
judicial department will decline so to construe an act of the legis-
lature as to give it -retrospective operation, unless the legislature
has very clearly indicated its intention that a contrary construction
shall be given. The judiciary will not lightly imply an intent
that the legislature intended to enact a retrospective law., And
indeed in some of the States the people have by a constitutional
provision prohibited the legislative department from passing such
laws. " The General Assembly shall have no power to pass retro-
active laws" is the language used in the constitutions of several of
the States. The judiciary in announcing anew principle must of
necessity make it applicable to past transactions-to the case or
transaction, then before the court. Judge-made law, therefore,
Bentham took great delight in referring to as dog-law; " ,You wait
till your dog does the thing you want to break him of, and then
you beat him for it."
* See his article in American Law Review for August, 1891.
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-;Buttbe law,-making ,pbwer-in this country isnot; alonein -the
legislative and, judicial departments fQf:,go'ernnent:, . Thepeople
of the. several .States; in the constitutions, which-, they hayep estab-
lished; have reserved-to- themselves some, portion of this pOwe.rby
requiring.that: certain proposed -laws: shall .be submitted to them,,
for 'their.approval. ,The legislative departmentmay.propose,cp -
stitutional amendments, but cannot make them a part of the fun-
damental law without, submitting them -to, a. vote of the _people.
Delaware furnishes the only exception to the, principle stated, and
in, that State alone, arem the, people without anydirectshare in
amending their constitution. In a large number of the States the-
people have resetved-the right to pass upqn, laws vhich create, State,
debtsbeyond a-certain, specified amount. , This is the case in Qali-,
tornia, Idaho,- Illinois,_'Iowa, Kansas, -Kentucky, Montana, Mis.
souri, New Jersey, New York,, Rhode Island, Washington-, and
Wyoming. In other States the people have reserved tothem-
selves the right to pass on, laws loaning the, credit, of the,
State to any. person,, association, ,or corporation. , There, are like.
reservations of power in the constitutions of the several, States in
regardt to -various matters which do not 'need enumeration here..
There seems to be a sentiment, more or less prevalent among the
people in favor of extending this, right of popular legislation by
the introduction of the principle of the Swiss Referendum. The
The People's party in the platform adopted by their national con-
vention in f892 commended to the favorable consideration of the
people, "the legislative system known as the Initiative and Blefer-
endum." The National Socialistic Labor party of the United
States declares that "'the people have the right to-propose laws and
to vote upon all measures: of importance according to the Refer-.
endum principle!' , , , ,
It is usual, to provide a check on the ,law-making power of o i~r
legislative, assemblies by conferring on the executive department
of the governmenta qualified veto power, Whatever may have-
been thought in other periods of our history,, the general opinion
in this country at the present time favors the existence, of a qunli-
fled veto in the executive, and the bitterness with which, the old
Whig party once assailed it has passed away. The e rly presidents
used the power only in rare instances. Washington vetoed but
two measures, Madison six, and Monroe one. Adams, andJeffer.
son did not exercise the power in a single instance. Since the-
HeinOnline  -- 3 N. W. L. Rev. 47 1895
NORTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW.
close of the civil war it has been employed much more frequently.
Mr. Lincoln only used it on three occasions. But Johnson vetoed
twenty-one bills, Grant forty-three, and Mr. Cleveland in his first
administration three hundred and one, being more than twice as
often as all the other presidents combined. As a result, a senate
committee made Mr. Cleveland's course the subject of a special
report, stating that it was an unconstitutional exercise of power
for a president to refuse to sign a bill simply because he disagreed
with congress regarding the expediency of the measure. In thi
conclusion the senate committee was undoubtedly mistaken. The
constitution confers the power on the executive, and does not
undertake to define the reasons for its exercise. It rests therefore
in the sound discretion of the executive to make use of it, or not,
for reasons satisfactory to himself. Washington based his second
veto solely on expediency. And it may well be employed to pre-
vent hasty, useless, unconstitutional, or impolitic legislation. In
this country it has worked well in practice. It has been said that
the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good
ones. And it has been well answered by Hamilton, that "The
injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws,
will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a num-
ber of bad ones." The danger to be dreaded is not one arising
from a dearth of legislation, but from over-legislation.
Under the American system of government the law-making
power of the judicial department can be checked by the law-mak-
ing power of the legislative department, not as affecting the par-
ticular case adjudicated upon, but in respect to all like cases there-
after arising. The law-making power of the legislative depart-
ment is held in check by the judicial department, which can
nullify any act of the legislative department which violates the
fundamental law as it is embodied in the constitution of either the
State or the United States. The law-making power of the people
is held in check by the fundamental law which they themselves
have established. Under the system of government prevailing in
Great Britain the law-making power of the legislative department
is supreme. It is not held in check either by the executive or
the judicial departments of the government, and the people have
imposed no restraint on its exercise in any fundamental law. In
Germany the constitution of the empire defines and limits the law-
making powers possessed by the Bundesrath and the Reichstag,
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out the judicial department of the government has no check upon
an unconstitutional exercise of the law-making power by the bodies.
referred to. In Switzerland, too, the judicial power of the federal
tribunal cannot check the law-making power lodged in the federal
assembly by pronouncing it to be in violation of the constitution
of the confederation. But in that country the people have reserved
unto themselves the power to directly nullify the action of the law-
making power by means of the referendum. In France, under the
old monarchyand an unwritten constitution, the judicial depart-
ment did in several instahces declare the acts of the legislative
department void as being contrary to binding right. But the con-
stitution of 1791, which was the first written one in Europe, de-
clared that the judicial, tribunals could not "interfere with the
exercise of the legislative power." And that restriction has con-
tinued in force in France under all forms of government, from
that time to this. Mr. Brinton Coxe has called attention to the
noteworthy fact that in France the power of the judiciary to nullify
the action of the law-making power was recognized under an un-
written. constitution and denied under a written one. He adds
that "French public law upon the subject is this in direct contra-
diction to Marshall's view of written constitutions." *
The qupstion suggests itself whethei the law-making power
should be lodged in a legislative assembly composed of a large or a
9mall number of representatives. At the present time the British
House of Commons consists of 670 members. The- French Cham-
ber of Deputies contains 584 members. The German Reichstag is
constituted of 397 members.; and the House of Representatives at
Washington of 332 members. The ratio of representation is there-
fore smaller in the United States than in any of the countries
named. We are sometimes told that in a multitude of counselors
there is safety. It is also claimed that it'is easier to corrupt a small
body than a large one, and therefore there is less likelihood of cor-
rupt and scandalous legislation where the law-making assembly is-
composed of many members. But it may be doubted whether our
experience in the United States justifies the claiin thus made. In
some of our State legislatures where the membership has'been tlie
largest, the most venal and iniquitous legislation has been enacted.
The "big membership" theory has not everywhere worked well as
a safeguard against corruption. t Alexander Hamilton expressed
* Coxe's Essay on Judicial Power, p. 83.
tSee The Nation, June 23, 1892, p. 460.
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the opinion in the Federahst, that in all legislative assemblies, the
greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the
men who will in fact direct their proceedings. The reasons which
he gives for the opinion seem eminently sound. , He says:
"In the first place, the more numerous any assembly may be, of
whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the
ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger
the number the greater will be the proportion of members of
limited information and of weak capacities. * * * It is pre-
cisely on characters of this description, that the eloquence and ad-
dress of the few are known to act with all their force."
He spoke with much wisdom when he declared in the same con-
nection:
"The people can never err more than in supposing that by
multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they
strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. :Expe-
rience -will forever admonish them, that, on the contrary, after
securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local in-
.formation, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they
will counteract their own views, "by every addition to their repre-
entatives."
In framing the fundamental law for our states this statement of
Hamilton's should be accepted as a sound principle of political
science, and one that cannot be disregarded but to our prejudice.
The method which the law-making power pursues in ascertain-
ing the collective will of its members, sometimes becomes a mat-
ter of great importance. Until recently no limit was placed on
the time within which debate might continue, in the British par-
liament. Fillibustering, or systematic obstruction, was rarely
resorted to until within the last twenty years. In the debates on
the Irish question, in 1877, and again in 1881, the filibustering
was so great that a closure rule was enacted in 1882, which gave
the speaker of the House of Commons the right of informing the
House that he thought the time for closing the debate had arrived
so that a motion to that effect might then be made. In 1887 a
rule was adopted and is still in force in the House of Commons,
which provides that any member may move ':that the question be
now put," and "unless it shall appear to the chair that such mo-
tion is an abuse of the rules of the House or an infringement of
the rights of the majority," the question shall be put and decided
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without debate. In both houses of parliament each member pres-
ent is held bound to vote, and can be compelled to vote. Thishas
always been the rule in that country. .The minority cannot defeat
legislation, either by filibustering tactics or by breaking the quo-
rum in declining to vote.
In the Senate of the United States neither of the rules men-
tioned is in force, and out of respect to the so-called "courtesy"
of that body a minority can obstruct important legislation, for
weeks at a time, to the serious injury of the businesg of the coun-
try. The recent experiences in the Senate were a humiliation and
a shame, and seriously impaired, both at home and abroad, the
respect entertained for the upper house of Congress. Any system
of rules, or miscalled "courtesy," which enables a small fraction of
a body to paralyze legislation by refusing to vote deserves the most
severe condemnation. The House of Representatives in 1890
adopted a rule, not now in force, providing that to make a quorum
"the names of members present who do not vote shall be noted
by the clerk and recorded in the journal." Under the rules at
present in force in the House it is possible to terminate debate,
but there is no method by which the majority can- legislate if the
minority break the quorum by declining to vote. The constitu-
tion gives even to the minority of each house a power to compel
the attendance of absent members. But what does their presence
avail if they can sit in their seats and paralyze all legislation by
declining to vote? The rules of all law-making bodies should give
to the presicding officer, under such circumstances, the power either
to count a quorum, or to punish the obstructionists for disorderly
behavior. Each house of Congress -is given by the Constitution
the power to punish -its members for disorderly behavior. It is
difficult to imagine any conduct morb disorderly than that which
is designed deliberately to make all legislation impossible.
In France the theory is that the, President of. the Chamber of
Deputies has a right, in order to obtain a quorum, to count all
memb ers who are present at the time, whether they vote or not.
This it is asserted he can do whether the authority is incorporated
in the rules or not. Bitt their rules contain a peculiar, provision
to the effect "that, in case no quorum, is present, a vote on the
question under discussion will be called for at the. next sitting,
when the result will be valid whatever may be !the number of
deputies who take part in the ballot. So the President-orders a
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vote, declares there is not a quorum, adjourns the sitting, calls the
house to order again at the end of ten minutes, and then orders a
new vote, which this time becomes valid." *
In Germany a member present and not voting is counted in order
to make a quoruni.
In Switzerland it is necessary that the quoirum should be present,
but not that they should vote. If a quorum is present the ballot
is binding when it is a majority of those voting.
Your attention has been directed to the fact that when the
people in this country came to establish State constitutions it was
not the legislative department that thev distrusted. Experience
soon led them to see the mistake they bad committed. The legis-
lative department has been deprived of the power it formerly pos-
sessed, of electing the executiye; his term of office has been ex-
tended until in almost half the States he now holds for four years
instead of one as formerly; and he has in almost every State been
given the veto power as a check upon legislation, whereas formerly
he possessed it not. The legislative department, which in some of
the States formerly constituted the court of final resort, has been
deprived of such power. This distrust of the legislative depart-
ment has caused a large number of constitutional restrictions to be
imposed upon its law-making power. In respect to a number of
subjects they are absolutely prohibited from legislating at all, while
as to many others they are only permitted to legislate by a general
law. And upon whatever subject they legislate they are required
to observe certain set forms thought essential to due care and
deliberation, and as . a preventive of fraud. The extent of the
change which has been made in the powers of the legislative
department may perhaps be better understood by a comparison
which Mr. Henry Hitchcock of St. Louis has made between the
Missouri constitution of 1820 with the constitution adopted in the
same State in 1875. Mr. Hitchcock tells us that the constitution
of 1820 with all its amendments up to 1855 contained only three
express restrictions on the legislative power, while the constitution
of 1875 in its fourth article contains fifty-six sections, more than
half of which, he says, either prohibit the enactment of laws upon
specified subjects, or prescribe the manner of enacting, amending,
and repealing laws already-in force.
Notwithstanding all the precautions which have been taken to
* See 153 North American Review, p. 788.
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restrain and check the law-makipg power of our legislative bodies, -
we are compelled to admit that the efforts have been in large part
unsuccessful; A comparison of the legislation enacted during the
first half 'of this century with that which has been enacted since is
not reassuring. Judge Cooley, than whom I know of no one better
qualified to speak, has expressed the opinion that the early legisla-
tion was in general more careful, more circumspect, and less open
to criticism as encroaching on private rights or sound principles,
than much of that more recent. And he declares. that by far the
larger part of all the doubtful legislation which the history of the
country presents has taken place since the year 1846, "" when radi-
cal ideas began to be characteristic of State constitutions, and the
theory-that officers of every department should be made as directly
as possible responsible to the people after short terms of service was
accepted as a political maxim." *
It cannot be -denied that in the United States there exists at the
present time a general distrust of our legislative bodies. The peo-
lack confidence in the intelligence, capacity, wisdom and integrity
of the state legislatures. It is becoming a difficult matter in this
country to induce men who are occupied in successful business
enterprises, or who are engaged in lucrative professional practice,
to sacrifice their personal interests by becoming members of the
legislative assemblies of the states. They do not appreciate mem-
bership -in such assemblies as an honor, and do not feel called upon
to make the financial sacrifice which such service involves. It is
too frequently the case, therefore, that men are chosen to these
positions whose education, experience and standing in the commu-
nity do not at all entitle them to such distinction, and who are not
pualified to wisely discharge the very responsible trust committed
to their keeping as law-makers for the commonwealth. It is also
unfortunately too often the case that corrupt men secure their
election to these legislative bodies for the money that can be made
by selling legislation- by "sand-bagging" corporations.
In our earlier history it was considered a high personal honor to
be a member of the law-making body of the state. The repkesent-
ative regarded himself as charged with grave personal responsibil-
ity respecting the enactment of law. He looked upon a public
office as a public trust, and considered his election to the legisla-
ture as a kind of civic decoration bestowed upon him for his worth
Princeton -BRfet , Mfarch, 1878, p. 286.
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by the people of his district. The pay was small the illicit profits
nothing. The best men in, the commonweath were willing to
serve it in the law-makiig body. We may, well ,deplore -that in
these later times this has been so greatly changed, and that good men
should feel so much reluctance about assuming the office of a legis-
lator, thus giving opportunity to bad men to crowd themselves
into public place "for what there is in it," without any sense of
duty or responsibility. Why has the "honorary" impulse to pub-
lic service so largely lost its force in the states- of the American
Union? And why is it that public office has so largely ceased to
be regarded by our law-makers as a public trust? Many reasons
are given in explanation, and I shall venture to call attention to
a few.
1. The rise of great cities has undoubtedly had much to do in
effecting the change referred to. Nearly half a century ago
De Tocqueville saw in the size of crtain American cities and in
the nature of their population a danger threatening the future secur-
ity of the Republic. Since that time our cities havegrown until our
urban population has become more than six times as great as when
De Tocqueville wrote, and far more heterogeneous. The immi-
grants from foreign lands generally seek our cities, and there the
several nationalities segregate themselves, living the old country
life over, speaking their own language. clinging to their old ideas,
practicing their old customs. Under such circumstances they do
not easily become assimilated with us. The result is that in the
cities especially, the morale of the voting constituency is much
lower than it formerly was. The foreign vote is either in the ma-
jority, or when it is not it holds the balance of power and controls
elections. The massing of large bodies of foreigners together
affords an excellent opportunity to the machine politician, and votes
are bought and sold without scruple. A man who buys votes to se-
cure his election may as a general rule be depended on to sell his own
when the opportunity presents itself. I [is moral sense is so blunted
thateven in cases where his vote is not purchased he can be pretty
certainly depended upon to vote on the wrong side of every question.
A man prominent in political life has declared it to be his observa-
tion that nine-tenths of the city menubers of the legislature of his
own state would. as a rule. be found hostile to any reform, and
that the only hope of reform was in the action of the country
nlenilbers.
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2. The growth of private corporations and of corporative p6w-
er has been another influence whose blighting effect on the moral-
ity. of legislative bodies has been marked. Not that the concep-
tion of a private corporation is an idea originated in our times,
or even in modern times. We all know that such corporations
existed amoig the Romans, and some have assserted that their ori-
gin is to *be found in the laws of Solon. But however old the .idea
may be, it is within our time that these corporations have grown
in number, in wealth, and in power, to such an extent as to make
them formidable for evil throughout the country, and to constitute
them a noticeable political and social phenomenon. Fifty years
ago there was hardly a railway corporation in the United States,
while now there are about two thousand such corporations, em-
ploying nearly a million of persons, and holding property worth
more than $7,000,000,000. We have great express and telegraph
companies, great manufacturing and mining companies, great
insurance and banking corporations. All these the state has had
to legislate concerning, and the corporations have found it desira-
ble to use illegitimate as well as legitimate influence to prevent
legislation hostile to their interests. To this end they have
spent money to elect legislators friendly to their interests, and to
defeat those deemed unfriendly. They have practiced bribery in the
legislative halls. And so notorious has all this become that certain
great railroads are commonly reported as "owning" the legisla-
tures of certain states. Thus has it been demonstrated not only
that corporations have no souls, but that the legislatures of too
many of our states havd none either. In 1613, Chief Baron Man-
wood declared that corporations had no souls; and proved it after
this fashion: "A corporation is a body aggregate; none can create
souls but God, but the king creates them, and therefore they have
no souls."
3. The principle of rotation in office which prevails so largely in
this country at the present time has not had a wholesome effect on
the character of our legislative bodies. In this respect the prac-
tice of European states is quite different from our own; and in our
own country quite a difference has existed between the practice of
the north and the south. One reason why the south has had so much
influence in the Congress has been due to the fact that it has kept
its able men there,, electing them and relecting them, thus giving
them the experience necessary to make them useful and influential.
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In. the north, on the other hand, it has been in recent times a sort
of unwritten law that after one had served two terms either in
congress or in the legislature it was his duty to step aside and allow
the office to be "passed around" as a kind of perquisite to the
workers. The extent of the change which has come over the
country in this respect may be inferred. from a table which appeared
in the New York Nation, June 23, 1892, giving the statistics for
the legislature of Connecticut. It shows how this 'principle of
rotation in the legislitive office has gained ground steadily .during
each decade of the century. In the decade beginning in 1790 the
number of representatives fe~lecied in Connecticut was 63.7 per
cent; in 1800 it was 54 per cent; in 1810, 41.7 per cent; in 1820,
26 per cent; in 1830, 22.6 per cent;'in 1840, 12.7 per cent; in
1850, 12.2 per cent; in 1860, 12.7 per cent; in 1870, 10 per cent;
in 1880, 9.3 per cent; in 892, 9.01 per cent.
The ANration is justified in asserting that this principle of rotation
is in practice fatal to any theory of 'legislative responsibility, as it
simply tempts a man of easy-going principles "to make the most
of his 'good time' as a legislator." It opens no career of state-
manship, and therefore no induceiients for one to. specially fit
himself for political life.
But, we may inquire, what principles should- control in the en-
actment of laws. Locke in his work on civil government declares:
"These are the bounds which the trust tha is put in them by
the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legis-
lative power of' every commonwealth, in all fdrms of government:
"-Frst. They are to govern by promulgated established laws,
not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule f6r rich
and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plou'gh.
"Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other
end ultimately but the good of the people.
"Thirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the
people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves or
their deputies. And this properly concerns only such govern-
ments where the legislature is always in being, or at least where
the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies,
to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
-Fourthly. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the,
power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere'but
where the people have." *
• Locke on Civil Government, § 142.
HeinOnline  -- 3 N. W. L. Rev. 56 1895
TE LAW-MAKING POWER.
I venture t6 add the following:
1. A statute must not violate the fuhdamental Jaw of the State or
Nation. Every legislator before entering upon the discharge of
his duties is sworn to support the constitution of the United States,
and, if he is to make State laws, the constitutioi of his State.:, If
he votes in favor of the enactment of a law which he believes un-
condtitutional, he violates his official path, wrongs the commoi-
wealth, and betrays the trust reposed in him. In detexmining
whether a certain measure shall be enacted into law it is 'his duty
to consider whether the law proposed is in "conformity to the con-
stitution,'and he is not relieved from that responsibility by the
fact that the question may afterwards be submitted to 'the courts
for final decision. And in the determination of this question of
coustitutionality the legislatQr and the judge are governed by
somewhat different principles. If the legislator doubts the con
stitutionality of the proposed law, it is .his duty to withhold his
vote from it. But when the question of constitutionality comes
before a court, the mere doubt of the judge is not sufficient ground
for declaring it unconstitutional. Prof. James Bradley Thayer, of
the Harvard Law School, in an admirable paper .read at Chicago in
August last before the Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform,
maintains the proposition that in cases where the courts are.called
on to pass on the constitutionality of a legislative act, "'the ulti-
mate question is not what is the true. meaning of the constitution,
but whether legislation is sustainable or not." The courts sustain
acts which in the opinion of the judges themselves a true construc-
tion of the constitution would not justify in cases where it is not
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature has *exceeded
its powers; 'If it is not clear beyond a reasonabM doubt that the
act in question is unconstitutionali it will be sustained by the
courts. "A legislative act is not t1 be declared void upon a mere
conflict of interpretation between the legislative and judicial
power. Before proceeding to annul, by judicial sentence, what
has been enacted by the law-making power, it should clearly ap-
pear that the act, cannot be supported by any yeasonable ilitend-
ment or allowable presumption." *
Again: '"It is but a decent .respect due to the . . legis-
lative body by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its
The Teo le v. The Su'perv'ors, 17 N. Y. 235.
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validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt." *
An accomplished lawyer, and former president of the American
Bar Association, John Randolph Tucker, of Virginia, has expressed
the opinion that the conscience of the legislator and of the execu-
tive should be.quickened to a more strict observance of constitu-
tion 1 limitations even than the judge. He says:
"The legislator cannot justify a vote to make an act a law, on
the ground that as judge he Would not be justified in annulling its
effect. For the legislator does not cross any forbidden line when
he refuses to enact what he believes is repugnant to the constitu-
tion; and he knows every fraudulent motive which would make
void his act, though screened from the judicial eye; he knows it,
and God knows it; and he cannot enact what that motive makes
void, without perjury of his soul, treachery to his trust, and treason
to his God. The legislator and the executive can do no dutiful
act, therefore, which they do not believe to be warranted in terms
and in motive by the constitution they are sworn to support. Sup-
port is affirmative duty. The oath is not negative, that they will
not pull down the pillars of the edifice; but that, as pillars, they
will support and uphold it."
2. A statute must be just in principle. Legislation is a branch of
ethics, and the legislator must have regard to ethical considerations.
Filangieri, a learned Neapolitan who, a hundred years ago, wrote
on the science of legislation, declared that the positive goodness of
a law consisted in its conformity with the principles of morality
and with the precepts of revelation. God and pature, he asserted,
protected the rights of mankind, and no transitory expediency
could justify their infringement.t The Aquiline law which ren-
dered it no more penal to kill a slave than a horse, resisted an au-
thority paramount to that by which it was prescribed.
Judge Dillon, in delivering his address as president of the
American Bar Association, said at Saratoga, in 1892:
"' Theoretically, and for many purposes, practically we must
discriminate law and morality, and define their respective prov-
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.
f Gotano Filangieri was born in Naples, in 1752, and his work. "La Sci-
enza delle Legislazione," was written when he 'was thirty years of age.
He died in 1788, in'his thirty-sixth year. The work was translated into
German, French, and Spanish. The first volume only was translated into
English, in 1792.
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inces. But those provinces always adjoin each other, and ethical
considerations can no more be excluded from the domain of law in
its every Tart than one can exclude the vital air from his room
and live."
Milton argues that to allow sin by law is against the nature of
law, the end of the law-giver and the good of the people.*
Bolingbroke declares that the laws of nature are truly "the laws
of laws," adding that if the civil laws are imperfect it is because
they.have been made without a sufficient and consistent regard to
natural law.t
Neither can I forbear asking your attention, somewhat at length;
to what Mr. Carlyle has to say on this subject:
"A continued series of votings transacted incessantly for sessions
long, with three-times-three readings, and royal assents as many as
you like, cannot make a law the thing which is no law. No, that
lies beyond them. They can make it a sheepskin act of Parlia-
ment; and even hang men (though now with difficulty) for not
obeying it-and this they reckon enough; the idle fools! I tell
you and them, it is a miserable blunder, this self-styled 'law' of
theirs; and I for one will study either to have no concern with it,
or else by all judicious methods to disobey said blundering, im-
pious, pretended 'law.' In which sad course of conduct, very
unpleasant to my feelings, but needful at such times, the gods and
all good men, and virtually these idle fools themselves, will be on
my side; and so I shall succeed at length, in spite of obstacles;
and the pretended 'law' will take down its gibbet-ropes, and abro-
gate itself, and march, with the town-drum beating in the rear of
it. and beadles scourging the back of it, and ignominious, idle
clamor' escorting it, to Chaos, one day; and the Prince of Dark-
.ness, Father of Delusions, Devil, or whatever his name be, who is
and was always its true proprietor, will again hold possession of it
-much good may it do him!
"M My friend, do you think, had the united Posterity of Adam
voted, and since the creation done nothing but vote, that three and
three were seven, would this have altered the laws of arithmetic;
or put to the blush the solitary cocker who continued to assert
privately that three and three were six? I consider, not. And i
arithmetic, think you, a thing more fixed by the Eternal, than the
" Milton's Works, vol. 2. p. 62.
f Bolingbroke's Works, vol. 4, p. 180.
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law§ of jus.tice are, n.d -what the right is of- man. towards man.?
The builder of this world w'as Wisdom and Divine Foresight, not
Folly and Chaotic. Accid&nt. Eternal law is sildntly presen.,
everywhere and everywhere. * .* * No pin's point can you
mark within the wide circle of the'all where God's laws are ndt.
Unknown to you; or known, (you had better try to .know them a
little!) -inflexible, righteous, eternal, not -to be queitioned by the
sdus df men." *
The design of all laws is to secure the happiness of the people,;
-and we may rest assured that ,cannot be promoted by any law
which violates the laws of morality or contravenes the principles -
of ethics.
When Mr. Bentham published' to the world his Theory of Legis-.
lation it. was, confidently asserted by his admirers that its publica-
tion made an epoch and a revolution in the science of which'it
treated. But the civilized world has not yet'accepted Mr: Ben-
-tbham's principle that utility, and utility alone, is theocriterion of
Tight and wrong, dnd ought to be the sole object of the legislator.
It is a mistake to base the approbation or disapprobation of a pub-
lie or private act simply on its tendency to produce pleasure or
pain. "" He who adopts," sayg Bentham, "the principle of utility,
esteems virtue to be a good only on account of the pleasures which
result from it; he regards vice as an evil only because of the pains
,which it produces. Moral good is good only by its. tendency to
produce physical good. Moral evil 'is evil only by its tendency to
produce physical evil." f It is only fair to add that by the word
ph ysical in'this connection, Mr. Bentham includes the pains and
pleasures of the soul as well as the pains and pleasures of sense.
We cannot, however, accept his theory that it is wiser in general
to follow the dictates of utility than the impressions of moral duty.
On the general question whether a thing is right pr wrong, it is
safer to trust to the common feelings of 'mankind than to indi-
vidual deliberation on whether more go6d th~n evil may be,
expected from a given action, more pleasure than pain, and that
without any rule or standard by which the intensity of any pain or
pleasure can be determined. We are furnished With no instru-
ment by.which we may take "'the altitude of enjoyment, or fathom
the depths of sorrow." It is safer for us to follow the beaten higli-
* Carlyle's Works, vol. 12, p. 306.
fI Bentham's Principles of Legislation, p. 3.
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way of. morality which the common experiencde of mankind has
approved, rather than some new way which that experiene con-
demns but which we fondly imagine will in our case afford more
pleasure than pain. "Socrates was Jn the* right," says Boling-
broke, ' .to curse the med Who first divided in opinion things tbat
cohered in nature -morality and utility."
3. A statute must be suitable to the circumstances of the state to
which it is to be applied. A law is not to be enacted sifnply fbr
its supposed philosophical principle. Lieber has said that "no
law is philosophical which does. not grow out of. the given circum-
stance - out of that so~iety for which it' is calculated." An ideal
commonwealth cannot be created by the enactment of a code of
laws ideally perfect. As Judge Cooley has expressed it:
"'Law is only the public will authoritatively and effectively
expressed; and it is a mere truism tbat'the moral standard of the
people must determine that of the laws instead of being deter-
mined by them. The-laws must necessarily express the prevailing
opinions and purposes of the people who make them, and not of
any more enlightened'and virtuous people who, at some future
time may be their successors. In this postulate may-be seen the
reason why the law eann'ot be an educator of the people; it would
be the people teaching themselves through the law; the teacher
giving himself instruction." *
Not only is it idle to talk of legislating'people into an ideal state
by an ideal system of laws, but it is idle to suppose that given such
a system of laws, the people 'would consent long to be governed by
them. Carlyle understood this when he wrote:
"The Constitution, the set of Laws, or prescribed Habits of
Acting, that men will live under, is the one which images their
Conictions-their faith as to this wondrous Universe, and what
rights, duties, capabilities. they have there; which stands sane-.
tioned, therefore, by Necessity itself; if not by a seen Deity, then
by an unseen ofie. Other Laws; whereof there are always enough
i'eady-made, are usurpations, which men do not obey, but rebel
-against, and abolish at their earliest convenience."
A writer on the English Constitution, Walter Bagehot, has said
that the United States could not have become monarchical, even if
the constitutional convention had decreed it, and the component
" An address given at the commencement of the Law and Dental Schools
of the University of Michigan, March 26. 1884.
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states had ratified. "The mystic reverence," he says, "the,
religious allegience, which are essential to a true monarchy, are
imaginative sentiments, that no legislature can manufacture in
any people."
The law-makers of a state are ordinarily men born within the
country for which they legislate, moulded according to its customs
and traditions, and influenced by the prejudices of their environ-
ment. They are the creatures, not the creators of their age. Leg-
islative reforms do not, as a rule, originate with them. They do
not lead public opinion, nor even keep abreast of it, being gener-
ally quite in the rear of it. It is not often necessary to caution
them against ideal legislation, or to remind them that Solon in
hi' wisdom did not undertake to give the Athenians the best laws, but
only the best they were able to bear. Law-making is therefore "*the
science of adaptations." The laws of Lvcurgus were not made for
and would have been unsuitable for Athens, just as the laws of
Athens would have ruined Lacedoemon, being wholly unsuited to
its needs and conditions. The laws which were administered at
Rome are not the laws which could be administered in London.
The laws which may answer the needs of the peoples of Asia, or
the peoples of Japan, are not those which are needed in or would
be tolerated by the people of the United States. The constitution
of the government, the character, customs and religion of the
people, the climate and position of the country, are all circum-
stances which the wise law-maker must consider in the enactment
of law.
4. Great care should be observed in the clearness and precision
of the language used in the law to be enacted. According tG
Bacon, "A conceivable perfection of a law consists in the clearness
and precision of its terms," and in this particular the greatest of
legislators have often failed. The careless manner in which many
of our state and federal laws are drawn is a reproach to our law-
making bodies. They should not be drawn by persons inexperi-
enced in the law, and in the rules of judicial construction.
What right has one, for example, to draft a penal statute unless
lie is aware that penal statutes are by the courts strictly con-
strued? Or what right has one to draft a statute in derogation of
the common law unless he is familiar with the same principle?
How can one intelligently use the word "may" in a statute unless
he knows under what circumstances the courts construe it to be'
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peremptory in its meaning and not merely optional? And how
can he use the word "shall" intelligently unless he knows the rule
by which the courts are governed in determining whether the word
is to have a mandatory or merely a. directory meaning? It would
seem to be desirable to make it the duty of the law officer of the
government in each state to examine every bill before it is finally
enacted into law, to the end that the language used may be clear,
definite, precise, and appropriate to the purpose of the legislative
body. The complaints which judges have made on this subject
have been many and bitter. They are constantly called upon to
construe statutes drawn by amateur and incompetent legislators,
and as one of them has expressed it, the task "sometimes involves
the necessity of harmonizing apparently inconsistent clauses," and
making sense of "provisions cast together haphazard :by different
minds, differently constituted, and looking to the different and
special objects without due regard to the harmony of the whole."
Lord O'Hagan, whose criticism it is that I have quoted, ex-
pressed in his capacity as judge the wish'for some department "by
which bills, after they pass committee, might be supervised and
put into intelligible and working order." The governor of the
state of New York some years ago recommended the legislature of
that state to create such a department. In France, under the
Empire, it was the practice to have the phraseology of all bills
passed by the chambers closely examined by the Council of State,
and every precaution taken to make them clear and precise in their
terminology, as well as to have them consistent with the existing
statutes. But we are told that'under the existing order of things
that country now suffers from carelessly framed laws. Any. mem-
ber of the chamber is at liberty -to amend a bill in any sort of
language, provided only he can secure the requisite number of votes.
In Switzerland bills are carefully prepared by the Federal Council.
The right of initiating legislation belongs to any n'ember of the
law-making body. He can bring the matter to the attention of
the chamber to which'he belongs, and if it is approved that body
recommends to the Federal Council that it shall draw up and pre-
sent a bill to the Assembly on the subject thus referred.* In
England Sir Frederick Pollock tells us that-
"M3fany an act of Parliament, originally prepared with the
greatest care and skill, and introduced under the most favorable
*Adams and Cunningham on The Swiss Confederation, p. 47.
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circunistaftces,, does not become law till it has been .made a thing
of shreds and patches hardly recognizable.by its author, or to any
one with an eye for the clothing of ideas in comely words, 'no less
ludicrous an object than the ragged pilgrims described by Bunyan:
'They go not uprightly, but all awry with their feet; one shoe goes
inward, another outward, and th 9ir hosen out behind; there a rag
and there a rent,, to the disparagement of their Lord."'
I take it that this description is not less-applicable-to the condi-
tion of bills which have passed the legislative bodies of this
country, including the congress of the United States.
It must be conceded that there is a disposition in the law-making
bodies to over-legislation. This. country, like other countries, has
suffered much in this. respect. The law-making power should be
humbled by. the thought that the great reforms which have been
effected in the laws have generally been accomplished, not in doing.
some new thing; but in undoing something old. For instance, the
reforms *hich Sir Samuel Romilly accomplished in the criminal
laws consisted in securing the repeal of laws previously enacted,
and %ihich imposed the penalty of death for upwards of two hun-
dred offenses. The reforms in matters pertainifig to religion have
consisted in the repeal of the laws enacted to compel uniformity in'
religious belief, and designed to make people religious by law by,
requiring them to attend religious services, and to contribute to
the support of religious bodies. So in reforms pertaining to trade
it will be found that they generally have consisted in undoing what
some preceding legislative body had enacted, as witness the repeal
in England of the laws regulating the wages of labor, the laws
regulating the prices of commodities, and laws regulating the inter-
est on money. It was the repeal of the Corn Lawg which created
anew the industrial life of England.
, To such an extent has that country been helped by the undoing
of what the law-making bodies had previougly enacted, that the
author of the History of Civilization in England has been led to
say that "The most valuAble additions made to legislation have
been enactments destructive of preceding- legislation; and the best
laws which have been passed, have been those' by which some
'former laws were repealed." *
We. are told by Demosthenes that among the Locrians the pro-
Buckle's History of Civilization, vol. 1, p. 200.
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poser of a new law iore a rope about his neck, signifying that'if'
his measure should' fail to work "well in practice, he was willing
that his life should be sacrificed. This has led Mr. Depew wittily
Ito declare that if such a rule prevailed with us, "the multitude of
executiofis would enforce, as no other experience could, that wise
maxim: ' That government is beit'which governs least."' *
The nhimber'of bills and joint resolutions introduced into the
House of Representatives during the First Session of the Fifty-first
Congress'was 12,402, while the nunber iii.troduced into the Senate
was 4,570- making a t6tal of 16,972. Fortunately for the coun-
try, only 1,335 passed both houses. It is safe to say that if the
principle prevciled with :us that prevailed with the Locri ans, the
number would have been very materially less. But it would be
quite unsafe to allege that there was a single member in either
house who read through not every bill that. was introduced, but
every bill that was passed. And'it is perfectly safe to say that
there were many mehbers in both houses 'who would not have under-'
stood every bill if they had read them. This is not said in any
offensive sense. To. legislate intelligently the law-maker, must
know accurately what the existing law on the subject is, and" he
must understand exactly what chan.ges in it the law proposed will
accomplish. Legislators may be men of learning and ability, and
yet not possessed of the qualifications necessary to make them in
all cases intelligent law-makers.
Law-givers have been called principes per2elui, because they
continue to rule after their death in the laws which they have
established. Bacon, expressing his opinion on gradations of honor,
names:
1st. The, founders of states.
2d. Law-givers.
3d. The deliverers and saviors of a country after long calamities.
4th. The fathers of their countries, which are just and prudent
princes.
5th. Lastly conquerors, "which -s not to be received amongst
the rest, except it be where there is an addition of more country
and territory to a better government than that was of the con-
quered."
To make the laws of a nation or of a state involves a tremendous
responsibility, and to be intkusted with such power should be recog-
* Depew's Orations, p. 485.
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nized as one of the greatest honors that can be attained. That
men should have been ambitious in previous ages to be enrolled in
the number of legislators with Solon, Lycurgus, Numa, and Jus-
tinian, is not surprising. The splendid words of Gibbon afford a
sufficient explanation of such aspirations. "" The vain titles of the
victories of Justinian," he says, "are crumbled into dust, but the
name of the legislator is inscribed on a fair and everlasting monu-
ment."
HENRY WA.DE ROGERS.
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